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Abstract—We consider a relay-assisted wireless network, where
the energy-harvesting buffer-aided relay node is powered by
radio-frequency signals from a source node wishing to commu-
nicate with its destination. We propose two secure cooperative
protocols for a network composed of a source node equipped with
a data buffer communicating with its destination in the presence
of a buffer-aided relay node and an eavesdropper. Our proposed
protocols are designed based on the channel state information
and the buffer state information at the source and relay nodes.
The burstiness of data at the source node queue (buffer) and the
energy recycling process at the relay are taken into account in our
analysis. In addition, we take the decoding and signal processing
circuit power consumption constraints into consideration. For
the limiting case of an infinite-size battery at the relay, we
derive a sufficient condition for the energy queue to saturate.
Our numerical results demonstrate the throughput gains of our
proposed protocols.
Index Terms—Buffers, energy recycling, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio-frequency (RF) energy harvesting represents the ca-
pability of converting the received RF transmissions into direct
current (DC) electricity. Wireless-powered relaying (WPR),
in which information is transmitted from the source to both
the destination and an energy-constrained relay node that
is powered by RF energy signals, is one of the attractive
applications of simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT). Most of the existing research work on
WPR assumes half-duplex relaying and adopts either time-
switching-based relaying (TSR) [1] or power-splitting-based
relaying (PSR) schemes [1]. In [2], the authors investigate
a time-switching-based full-duplex WPR system, where the
energy-harvesting relay node operates in a full-duplex mode
with simultaneous information reception and transmission.
Unlike the existing TSR or PSR protocols, which are the
most commonly studied schemes for SWIPT in the literature,
we propose simpler protocols which do not require a strict
synchronization time switching process as in TSR or require a
dedicated power splitting circuit that increases the complexity
of the hardware design as in PSR. In addition, TSR and PSR
require the optimization over the power-splitting ratio and
switching-time, which consumes energy and complicates sys-
tem design. The investigated full-duplex system in [2] suffers
from severe self-interference and it requires additional energy
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consumption at the relay node to implement the sophisticated
analog and/or digital interference-cancelation scheme [3]. In
our proposed protocols, the self-interfering channel at the relay
node is beneficial since it enables the relay to reuse its own
transmitted energy. This actually represents the so-called self-
energy recycling (loop energy) [4], i.e., the energy used for
information transmission can be harvested by the relay and
reused in addition to the RF energy harvested from the ambient
transmissions. In [4], the authors proposed an interesting idea
for energy recycling through the self-interfering link. The
relay adopts a recycling energy protocol in which half of
the time slot is used for data transmission from the source
to the relay while the second half of the time slot is used
for simultaneous data transmission from the relay to the
destination and energy transfer from the source to the relay.
In the second transmission phase, the relay recycles its own
transmit energy.
In this letter, we explore the potential benefits of channel
state information (CSI), the buffering capability of the relay
node, the burstiness of source data (i.e. sporadic and random-
ness of the data arrivals at the source node), the presence of
a direct link between the source and its intended destination,
and the buffer state information at various system nodes to
further enhance the throughput of the system studied in [4].
Furthermore, we assume the presence of an eavesdropper and
impose hardware constraints such as limited-power transmis-
sions, a fixed-modulation scheme and limited processing and
decoding energy consumption.
We consider a buffer-aided relay channel where a source
communicates with its destination in the presence of an
energy-constrained buffer-aided relay node and a potential
eavesdropper. The contributions of this letter are summarized
as follows. We design two protocols for secure communica-
tions between a source and its destination based on the CSI
and the buffer state information (i.e. dynamics of the system
queues). Unlike [2], [4], we assume the presence of a direct
link between the source and its destination and investigate the
presence of an eavesdropping node in the system. Furthermore,
we include the energy consumption due to data and decoding
processing in our analysis. Unlike most existing work, we
assume that the relay energy and data queues are limited in
size. Moreover, we consider energy harvesting recycling where
the energy-constrained relay can recycle the energy transmitted
from its transmit RF chain to its RF-to-DC conversion circuits
through the loopback channel. For the limiting case of an
infinite-size battery at the relay, we derive a sufficient condition
2for the energy queue to saturate.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider the randomize-and-forward relay channel [5],
where a source, S, communicates with its destination, D,
with the assistance of an energy-constrained relay, R, and in
the presence of an eavesdropper, E. In the randomize-and-
forward relaying protocol, the source and relay nodes use
different codebooks to transmit the secret messages [5] which
increases the security of the system and increases ambiguity
at the eavesdropper. We make the following assumptions in
this letter. The relay is assumed to be an energy harvester that
is solely powered by the RF signals from the source, S [4].
It is equipped with two antennas while all other nodes are
each equipped with one antenna. Time is partitioned into slots
each with a duration of T = 1 seconds.1 The channel has a
bandwidth of W Hz. The source node, S, has an unlimited-
size data buffer (queue) to store its incoming traffic, denoted by
QS . The relay maintains two limited-size buffers: an energy
buffer (rechargeable battery) to store the energy transferred
from the source to the relay, denoted by Qe, and a data buffer
to store the relayed source data packets, denoted by QR. The
maximum buffer size of QR and Qe are CR packets and
Emax energy units, respectively. We assume a fixed-rate data
transmission as in, e.g., [6]. If a node transmits in a given time
slot, it sends exactly one data packet of size B bits over the
entire time slot. Hence, the spectral efficiency is R = B/W/T
bits/sec/Hz. We assume fixed-power transmissions as in, e.g.,
[6]. Without loss of generality, we assume that the source uses
the same power level for both information and energy signal
transmissions. The source and relay average transmit powers
are PS Watts and PR Watts, respectively. Thermal noise is
modeled as an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) random
process with zero mean and variance κ Watts/Hz. The relay
cannot transmit and receive information at the same time and
over the same frequency band, which is a practical assumption
because practical implementations of full-duplex schemes [3]
are typically costly and can suffer from a significant level of
loop interference.
Each link experiences flat block-fading where the channel
coefficient is assumed to be constant during a time slot dura-
tion and changes from one time slot to another identically and
independently in a random manner. The channel coefficient
of the i − j link is denoted by hi,j and its gain, which is
the squared magnitude of the channel coefficient, is denoted
by gi,j = |hi,j |2, where |x| denotes the absolute value of x.2
It is assumed that all the channel coefficients are known to
all the nodes through feedback or channel estimation3 [4].
1Since the time slot duration is normalized, the power and energy terms
are used interchangeably.
2To simplify notation, we omit the time index from the symbols.
3The eavesdropper is assumed to be another non-hostile source node that
utilizes the spectrum to communicate with the destination and the relay. CSI
knowledge at the nodes is beneficial in our proposed protocols for: 1) efficient
utilization of the secured time slots by the source and relay nodes since only
one node is selected for data transmission in a given time slot, 2) preserving
the node energy given that the energy at the relay node is limited, 3) avoiding
the retransmission of the same data by the same node which reduces the
system secrecy since the eavesdropper can then combine the data received at
its receiver. If the eavesdropper’s CSI is not known at the legitimate nodes, the
proposed protocols can operate based on the link capacity and buffer states.
The energy dissipated in operating the transmit RF chain,
i.e., the signal processing power consumption in the relay’s
transmit circuit caused by filters, frequency synthesizer, etc,
is EpT = Ep joules per time slot. For the relay to transmit
a data packet, it needs Ep energy units to operate its circuits
for one second and PR energy units for its data transmission.
Hence, the energy queue must maintain at least Et = PR+Ep
energy units for the relay to transmit a data packet in a given
time slot. In addition, we assume a certain processing and
decoding energy level, denoted by Ed, which represents the
needed energy to perform decoding and data processing at the
relay when it receives data. This energy amount is a function
of the number of received bits and other hardware constraints.
We assume that the energy needed to decode a packet is Ed
energy units per time slot. The source uses a known time-
invariant signal for powering the relay. This signal is known
at all nodes including the eavesdropper; hence, its interference
can be canceled out before information decoding.
For given channel realizations, the secrecy capacity of the
i− j link in the presence of eavesdropper ℓ is [5], [7]
C
ℓ
i,j =
[
log2
(
1 +
Pigi,j
κW
)
− log2
(
1 +
Pigi,ℓ
κW
)]+
(1)
where [·]+ = max{·, 0}. If gi,j > gi,ℓ, the secrecy capacity
is greater than zero and a nonzero data rate is achievable.
Otherwise, the link is unsecured and the achievable secrecy
rate is zero. The link is said to be in secrecy outage, if
the instantaneous channel secrecy capacity is lower than the
transmission rate. Since the transmission rate is R, the secrecy
outage condition is Cℓi,j < R.
The energy harvested at the relay when it uses only one
antenna, say antenna r ∈ {1, 2}, and ignoring the negligible
energy from the receiver noise (as in, e.g., [2], [4]) is
EH,1 = η
(
PSTgS,Rr + δPRTgRr,Ry
) (2)
where δPRTgRr,Ry is the amount of self energy, δ = 1 if
the relay is transmitting and zero otherwise, r 6= y ∈ {1, 2},
and 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is the RF-to-DC conversion efficiency. If the
relay uses its two antennas to harvest energy from the source
transmission, the total harvested energy is given by
EH,2 = ηPST (gS,R1 + gS,R2) (3)
III. PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
In the following, we describe our proposed protocols which
differ in terms of implementation complexity.
1) Fixed-Antenna Assignment: In this protocol, we assume
that the antennas are always assigned to the same circuits. That
is, one antenna is assigned for data reception and transmission
and the other antenna is assigned for energy harvesting. When
there is no data reception or transmission, both antennas are
used for energy harvesting. Our proposed SWIPT with fixed-
antenna assignment protocol is summarized as follows:
• If the direct link is secure and not in outage, i.e., R ≤
CES,D, the source transmits the packet at its queue head.
The relay uses its two antennas for energy harvesting.
• If the S − D link is not secured or cannot support R
bits/sec/Hz (i.e. R > CES,D), R ≤ CES,R, QS is not empty,
QR is not full, and the energy queue Qe has at least
3the energy needed for data decoding, i.e., Qe ≥ Ed, S
sends data to R. In this case, the relay harvests energy
from the source’s RF transmission. Here, we assign
priority to source transmission over relay transmission
when QS > 0, the relay data queue is not full, Qe ≥ Et,
and the R−D link securely supports R bits/sec/Hz. If the
energy in Qe is lower than the decoding energy, the relay
can neither receive nor transmit data. If the relay has no
data or/and its link cannot securely support R bits/sec/Hz
or/and Qe < Et, the source sends energy to the relay.
• If R ≤ CER,D, {R > CES,D,R > CES,R, QS > 0} or the
source queue is empty, QR is nonempty, and the relay
has more than Et energy units, the relay transmits the
packet at the head of QR and the source sends energy
to the relay by generating an energy signal with average
power PS . A portion of the relay transmit energy loops
back to the RF-to-DC conversion circuits and is further
converted to DC electricity.
• If R > CES,D, R > CES,R, and R > CER,D, or if all the
data queues are empty, the source sends energy to the
relay if Qe is not full. The relay uses its two antennas
for energy harvesting. If Qe is full, both the source and
the relay remain completely idle.
From the above-mentioned cases, we have only six possi-
ble states for the (source,relay) activities: (transmit infor-
mation,receive information and energy), (transmit informa-
tion,receive energy), (transmit information, idle), (transmit en-
ergy,simultaneously receive energy and transmit information),
(transmit energy,receive energy), and (idle,idle). Hence, based
on the CSI and the buffer state information, the control unit
(which can be either the relay or the destination since they are
the receiving nodes and they can feed back each other with
all the necessary information) sends 3 bits to inform all nodes
about the current state.
Based on the protocol description above, the average service
rate of the source data queue is given by
µs = PS,D + PS,DPS,R Pr{Qe ≥ Ed, QR < CR} (4)
where Pi,j is the probability of secrecy capacity outage of the
i − j link, and Pi,j = 1 − Pi,j . Under the Rayleigh-fading
channel model, the secrecy outage probability of the i− j link
in the presence of an eavesdropping node ℓ is given by [8]
P
ℓ
i,j= Pi,j =Pr{C
ℓ
i,j < R}=1−
σi,j
σi,j+2Rσi,ℓ
exp(−κW 2
R
−1
Piσi,j
)
where σi,j is the average of |hi,j |2.
Since the relaying queue cannot transmit or receive more
than one data packet in a given time slot, its Markov chain
is modeled as a birth-death process. The transition probability
from state m to state m+1 at the relaying data queue, denoted
by αm, is given by
αm = α = PS,DPS,R Pr{Qe ≥ Ed, QS > 0}, 0 ≤ m < CR (5)
The transition probability from state 0 < m ≤ CR to state
m− 1 at the relaying data queue, denoted by βm, is given by
βm = β=PR,D (X Pr{QS>0, Qe≥Et}+Pr{QS=0,Qe≥Et}) ,
∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , CR − 1},
βCR=PR,D (PS,D Pr{QS>0, Qe≥Et}+Pr{QS=0, Qe≥Et})
(6)
where X = PS,DPS,R.
The average end-to-end secure throughput (i.e. the average
number of successfully and securely received packets at the
destination per time slot) is given by
µ= PS,D Pr{QS 6= 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
successfully sent packets from
the source to the destination
+ PR,D (φ1 + φ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
successfully sent packets from
the relay to the destination
(7)
where φ1 = X Pr{QS > 0, Qe ≥ Et, 0 < QR < CR}+
Pr{QS=0, Qe≥Et, 0 < QR < CR} and φ2 = PS,D Pr{QS>
0, Qe≥Et, QR = CR}+Pr{QS=0, Qe≥Et, QR = CR}. The
energy queue has continuous service and arrival rates. Let ETin
denote the amount of energy transferred from the source to the
relay in time slot T ∈ {1, 2, . . .} and ETout denote the amount
of energy used by the relay in time slot T. The energy queue
evolves as follows:
Q
T+1
e = Q
T
e − E
T
out + E
T
in (8)
where QTe denotes the amount of energy in Qe at the beginning
of time slot T. In a given time slot, ETin is equal to zero,
EH,1, or EH,2 based on the activity of the source (i.e. active or
inactive) and the number of antennas used to collect the energy
transferred from the source. If the relay decodes a packet,
E
T
out = Ed. If the relay transmits a packet, ETout = Et. If the
relay is idle, ETout = 0.
Next, we derive a sufficient condition for the relay to
be always saturated with energy when Emax is very large,
which represents a sufficient condition to consider the relay
as a wireless node with reliable power supply. The minimum
average harvested energy throughout the network operation,
which is obtained when only one antenna is always used
for energy harvesting even when the relay uses its two
antennas and assuming that there is no energy recycling, is
ηPSTE [gS,R] = ηPSσS,R, where T = 1 seconds and E [·]
represents the statistical expectation. According to Loynes’
theorem, a queue is unstable (i.e. overflows) when its average
arrival rate is higher than its average departure rate [9]. Since
the maximum average transmit energy (i.e. departure rate)
from the relay is (PR + Ep)PR,D and the minimum average
transmit energy (i.e. arrival rate) is ηPSσS,Rr , the incoming
energy at the energy queue is higher than the outgoing one
when ηPSσS,R > (PR + Ep)PR,D → PS > (PR+Ep)PR,DησS,R ,
which represents a sufficient condition for the energy queue
to saturate with energy. In this case, the average service rate
of the source queue can be rewritten as
µs=PS,D+PS,DPS,R Pr{QR < CR} ≤ PS,D + PS,DPS,R︸ ︷︷ ︸
=µmax
(9)
with PS > (PR+Ep)PR,DησS,R .
Assume Bernoulli arrivals at the source with mean λs
packets/slot as in [6]. Then, according to Loynes’ theorem,
the sufficient condition for the source queue to saturate is
λs ≥ µmax. If this condition is satisfied, the source will always
be saturated with data packets. The transition probabilities of
QR are given by
αm = PS,DPS,R, βm = PR,DPS,RPS,D, βCR = PR,DPS,D
4with m < CR.
Analyzing the Markov chain of the relaying queue, we get
the following closed-form expressions for the local balance
equations (derivation is omitted due to lack of space):
Γmαm = Γm+1βm+1, 0 ≤ m ≤ CR − 1 (11)
where Γm denotes the probability of having m packets at
QR. Using the balance equations successively, the stationary
distribution of Γm for QR occupancy is given by
Γm = Γ0
m−1∏
n=0
αn
βn+1
,where Γ0 =
(
1 +
CR∑
m=1
m−1∏
n=0
αn
βn+1
)−1
(12)
where Γ0 is obtained using the normalization condition∑CR
m=0 Γm = 1.
2) Adaptive-Antenna Assignment: Next, we assume that the
relay adopts an adaptive scheme for efficient antenna usage as
in [2]. That is, the two antennas can be used adaptively for
data transmission and reception, and RF energy harvesting.
Without loss of generality, we use a subscript r ∈ {1, 2}
to indicate the relay’s first and second antennas, respectively.
If only one of two antennas at node i is selected for data
transmission, the maximum secrecy capacity of node i when
it communicates with node j using the antenna with the
highest link gain in the presence of eavesdropper ℓ is given
by Cℓi,j = max{Cℓi1,j , C
ℓ
i2,j
}. Similarly, if node i is equipped
with one antenna and node j is equipped with two antennas
and only one of them is selected in a given time slot for
data reception, Cℓi,j is given by Cℓi,j = max{Cℓi,j1 , C
ℓ
i,j2
}.
Consequently, we conclude that having additional antennas
increases the achievable secrecy rate. Since the nodes transmit
their data at a fixed rate R, we select the antenna which
achieves the target rate and assign the other antenna for energy
harvesting. Hence, the relay harvests more energy from the
ongoing transmission if the antenna with the lowest channel
gain to S is selected for data transmission/reception.
As in the previous subsection, we can write down the
expressions of µs, αm, βm and µ. In this protocol, we have six
possible states for the activity of the source and the relay as in
the fixed-antenna assignment protocol, but one additional bit is
required for the identification of the antenna index used at the
relay in case of information reception/transmission. The total
number of states under this protocol is 12; hence, the control
unit sends 4 bits to inform the nodes about the current state.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
protocols using 50000 time slots. For our numerical results, we
assume the Rayleigh-fading channel model where each chan-
nel is distributed according to a circularly-symmetric Gaussian
random variable with zero mean and unit variance, the AWGN
power at a receiving node is normalized to κW = 1 Watts,
and the energy needed for data decoding is Ed = 3 joules.
The time slot duration is normalized to T = 1 seconds and
EpT = Ep = 2 joules. Furthermore, the transmit powers of
the source and the relay are PS = PR = 20 Watts. In addition,
the maximum buffer size of QR is CR = 10 packets and the
maximum energy level at Qe is Emax = 40 joules. Note that
the levels of the transmit powers and energies are large because
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Fig. 1. Average end-to-end secure throughput of our proposed protocols
compared to the protocol proposed in [4].
the noise power and the time slot duration are normalized. The
arrivals at the source data queue are assumed to be Bernoulli
random variables with mean λs = 1 packets per time slot.
Moreover, we assume that the conversion efficiency is η = 1.
In Fig. 1, the average end-to-end secure throughput, which
represents the average number of successfully and securely
received packets at the destination, in packets per time slot
(packets/slot) is plotted against the target spectral efficiency,
R, for our proposed protocols and compared to two baseline
protocols, namely the protocol in [4] for our randomize-
and-forward buffer-aided relay system and what we call the
conventional protocol where the relay node is not equipped
with a data buffer and there is no energy recycling. We observe
that significant throughput gains are achieved by our proposed
protocols for all values of R because our protocols take
into consideration energy recycling, buffer state information
at nodes, eavesdropper impact, and CSI, resulting in more
efficient use of the available energy at the relay and the se-
cured time slots. In addition, our adaptive-antenna assignment
protocol outperforms the fixed-antenna assignment protocol,
but at the expense of increased implementation complexity.
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